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REMOVING NONCONFORMING CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM THE SHADOW OF
THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE
MODIFICATION: A PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
By J. Eric Smithburn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether and under what circumstances a parent who is ordered to
pay child support is entitled to credit against a child support arrearage
is one of the most vexing problems for the family court. Some courts
consistently demand strict adherence to a child support order and do
not permit retroactive modification.' Other courts have allowed retroac-
tive modification of support decrees when equity dictates.' A recent
amendment to the Social Security Act, however, prohibits retroactive
modification of child support orders, leaving a number of unanswered
questions concerning credit requests for nonconforming support
payments.3
This Article explores the problems created by nonconforming child
support payments' unfortunate entanglement with the rule against ret-
roactive modification of support orders. It also suggests a more equita-
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Member of the faculties of the National Judi-
cial College, the National College of Juvenile and Family Law of the National Council of Juvenile
and Family Court Judges and the Indiana Judicial Center. Professor Smithburn is a former Indi-
ana trial court judge and a member of the Indiana Bar and the Bar of England and Wales, The
author wishes to acknowledge the assistance in preparation of this article to James P. Gillespie,
Notre Dame Law School, Class of 1988, and Steven M. Richard, Notre Dame Law School, Class
of 1989.
See infra notes 12-25 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27-111 and accompanying text.
Congress passed the Bradley Amendment as part of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9103, 100 Stat. 1973 (1986), amending the
Social Security Act § 466(a), Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1306 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) or The Bradley
Amendment].
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ble approach to this aspect of child support enforcement. Part I defines
nonconforming child support payments and the problems they present
to family courts. Part II outlines various approaches the states have
taken concerning requested credit against support arrearages for non-
conforming payments. Part III discusses the rule against retroactive
modification of support orders and its relationship with nonconforming
payments problems. Part IV examines the probable impact of 42
U.S.C. Section 666(a)(9) on credit requests for nonconforming pay-
ments. Part V argues for a more equitable approach to handling non-
conforming payment issues and proposes an amendment to 42 U.S.C.
Section 666(a) providing for judicial discretion. Part VI concludes that
justice would be served best by legislatively empowering a court to give
credit for nonconforming payments when dictated by fairness and
equity.
II. WHAT ARE NONCONFORMING PAYMENTS AND WHAT
PROBLEMS Do THEY CAUSE?
Generally speaking, a nonconforming payment is any payment
which by its method deviates from the letter of the court's child sup-
port order. Two common situations invite nonconforming payment liti-
gation. The first occurs when the obligated (usually noncustodial) par-
ent makes cash or in kind advances to the obligee (custodial) parent or
directly to the children, for the benefit of the children, which do not
conform to the method of payment stated in the court's child support
decree. For example, a typical order would provide that the obligor pay
to the clerk's office the sum of $100.00 per week per child for the sup-
port and benefit of the parties' two minor children. Rather than make
"conforming payments" to the clerk, the obligor might send cash di-
rectly to the children, buy them clothing and school supplies, and enroll
them in swimming classes at the YMCA. Often the obligated parent
will not give a second thought to the "nonconforming" nature of his or
her expenditures for the children until the arrearage question surfaces
at a contempt hearing initiated by the obligee. The second situation
occurs when the obligated parent takes physical custody of the children
for an extended period. The noncustodial parent feeds, clothes, and pro-
vides a home for the children, until they are returned to the custodian,
all with no modification of the court's support decree. Should the obli-
gor later be given credit against an alleged arrearage for cash pay-
ments and other expenditures which were not intended by the obligor
as birthday, Christmas, or other gifts? What about awarding credit to
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the obligor for the court-ordered amount of support for the time he or
she had extended physical custody of the children in the absence of a
modified custody order?
The nonconforming payment and request for credit issues come to
the court's attention in several ways. The issues may arise when the
obligated parent files a petition to modify the child support order or a
petition to determine arrearage and request credit. These issues may
also arise when the custodial parent files a verified information for a
rule to show cause, requesting of the court that the obligor be held in
contempt for violating the court's child support order. The court first
must determine whether the obligor intended the expenditures as gifts
or as payments for child support pursuant to the court's order. If the
court determines that the expenditures were intended as gifts, the in-
quiry ends; the obligor is liable for the arrearages, and, of course, may
be held in contempt for nonpayment. If the court determines that the
expenditures were intended as child support, the court then must deter-
mine whether it has discretion to credit the nonconforming payments
against the obligor's arrearage. When discussing credit, it is important
to realize that by allowing credit for nonconforming payments, the
court is technically retroactively modifying the support order. This was
evident particularly in jurisdictions where the support obligation vested
on the date due or became a judgment as a matter of law and the
court's order, by recognizing past (nonconforming) payments which
were not of record, altered the arrearage or the amount of the obligee's
judgment. A closer look at the order granting credit for nonconforming
payments, however, reveals that such courts have not modified the
amount of the support order, but for equitable reasons have permitted
payment in a form different from that ordered by the court, and only to
this extent do credit orders constitute a retroactive modification.
III. THE RULE AGAINST RETROACTIVE MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
ORDERS AND NONCONFORMING PAYMENTS
The prevailing view in this country is that a party, as a matter of
law, should not be permitted to retroactively modify a child support
order." The rule against retroactive modification applies to an obligee's
I The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 316 9A U.L.A. 147 (1987) provides in part "the
provisions of any decree respecting ... support may be modified only as to installments accruing
subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances so
substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable." See also Sutton v. Sutton, 359
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request to retroactively increase a support order as well as an obligor's
petition for a retroactive decrease of the support decree. The focus of
this Article is on the obligor's request for credit for nonconforming
payments and its often confusing relationship with the rule against ret-
roactive modification of child support orders.
A retroactive modification of a support decree is any judicial order
which alters, in form or amount, payments past due to the obligee for
the benefit of minor children. There are both public policy and practi-
cal reasons for the rule against retroactive modification. The custodial
parent must be able to rely upon the financial assistance provided by a
court order for child support, at least until there is a formal legal ac-
tion to modify the support order. 5 Also, courts are concerned that per-
mitting a noncustodial parent to unilaterally vary the terms of a decree
usurps from the custodian the right to determine the manner in which
the support money should be used for the children.6 The rule against a
retroactive modification also is generally followed, for example, where
the obligor seeks credit against the support arrearage where the chil-
dren, who are in the obligee's custody, reside with him. The court's
denial of retroactive modification in this situation acts as a safeguard
against the obligor influencing the children to avoid the obligee.7 An-
other common justification for prohibiting retroactive modification and
denying credit is that the arrearages have ripened into judgments as
they become due and are thus final.8 Additionally, to permit a noncus-
todial parent to increase the amount of child support at one time, re-
duce it another time, and require an adjustment for the differences in
the future might result in economic hardship for the child.9
So. 2d 392 (Ala. 1979); Hadford v. Hadford, 633 P.2d 1181 (Mont. 1980); Annotation, Right to
Credit on Accrued Support Payments for Time Child is in Father's Custody or for other Volun-
tary Expenditures, 47 A.L.R.3d 1031 (1973).
6 Wood v. Wood, 407 A.2d 282, 287 (Me. 1979).
6 See, e.g., McConnell v. Theriot, 295 So. 2d 60 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Odum v. Odum, 273
So. 2d 576 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 245 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1971);
McCrady v. Mahon, 119 N.H. 247, 400 A.2d 1173 (1979); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 86 Utah 229,
42 P.2d 191 (1935).
Souran v. Souran, 80 Misc. 2d 476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (support payments due are to be treated as judgments); Holley
v. Holley, 264 Ark. 35, 568 S.W.2d 487 (1978) (entitlement to payment vests in person entitled to
it as payments accrue as equivalent of debt due). But see HAw. REV. STAT. § 580-47(d) (1985)
(court may revise its orders as they do not vest upon becoming due but are subject to control of
the court.); Slep v. Slep, 43 N.J. Super. 538, 129 A.2d 317 (1957) (past installments of alimony
and child support do not vest as they become in arrears but are subject to the control of the
court).
Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961) (decree setting husband's pay-
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It is important to note the distinction between an obligor's request
for credit for nonconforming payments and a petition for retroactive
modification of the amount of a child support order based upon a sub-
stantial change in circumstances. Where a party seeks retroactive mod-
ification due to changed circumstances, he or she petitions the court for
reduction of the child support obligation as of a prior date. If the court
grants the modification request, any arrearage is adjusted based upon
credit for the reduced amount of the support order. Where, however, a
party requests credit for nonconforming payments, he or she merely
seeks judicial recognition of past support payments which, though
made, did not strictly conform to the method of payment set out in the
court's child support decree. The essential difference between the two
situations is that nonconforming payments alter only the form of the
payments, whereas retroactive modification of a child support order due
to changed circumstances seeks to reduce the amount of child support
past due. Unfortunately, many courts tend to lump nonconforming pay-
ments in the same category as retroactive modification due to changed
circumstances."0 This Article proposes a way to remove nonconforming
payments from the shadow of the rule against retroactive modification,
without affecting the prohibition of retroactive modification based upon
changed circumstances.
The policy reasons for not permitting retroactive modifications due
to changed circumstances are entrenched in the law. Dangers of eco-
nomic hardships to the children, where funds which the obligee reason-
ably expected to be available for the children's needs are not forthcom-
ing, are well documented in cases." This Article therefore proceeds
with considerable deference to the general rule prohibiting retroactive
modifications based upon changed circumstances.
IV. How THE STATES HANDLE CREDIT REQUESTS FOR
NONCONFORMING PAYMENTS: A PATCHWORK QUILT
The laws of the various state jurisdictions on whether nonconform-
ing payments should be credited to cancel or reduce child support ar-
ments are fixed according to his ability to pay and the children's needs; to permit him to adjust
payments would result in continuous trouble and turmoil).
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (statute makes no distinction between modifications crediting
nonconforming payments and other retroactive modifications); Bowden v. Bowden, 426 So. 2d 448
(Ala. 1983); Folds v. Lebert, 420 So. 2d 715 (La. 1982); Schafer v. Schafer, 95 Wash. 2d 78, 621
P.2d 721 (1980).
" See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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rearages fall into seven classifications. This spectrum of approaches
ranges from strict construction of the rule against retroactive modifica-
tion, as applied to credit requests for nonconforming payments, to a
flexible approach, emphasizing equitable considerations and judicial
discretion. These approaches may be described as follows: (1) strict,
either forbidding retroactive modification of child support orders or de-
manding strict compliance with support orders; (2) strict, but allowing
for deviation in very limited circumstances; (3) semi-strict, allowing for
a deviation in a series of broader circumstances (these states are still
inclined to withhold credit); (4) equitable, but only representing a
trend; (5) equitable, but the facts must fit into certain limited circum-
stances (these states are inclined to grant credit); (6) equitable, with
only broad guidelines to meet; and (7) equitable, and within the discre-
tion of the court or there is statutorily authorized retroactive modifica-
tion. Not only is there great divergence on the treatment of noncon-
forming payments among the state jurisdictions, but even within some
states appellate districts disagree on this subject. Thus, including credit
requests for nonconforming support payments in the analysis of retro-
active modification of support orders presents everyone concerned with
a patchwork quilt of law, equity, and policy.
A. Strict Construction States
The strict construction states adhere to the majority view, which
denies retroactive modification of child support decrees treating re-
quests for credit for nonconforming payments as a retroactive modifica-
tion issue. These states are: (1) Connecticut;12 (2) Hawaii; 3 (3) Mas-
sachusetts;1" (4) New Mexico; 15 (5) North Dakota;16 (6) West
Jennings v. Jennings, 11 Conn. Supp. 391 (1942). In Jennings, the court held that it could
not retroactively modify child support so as to release the father from his duty of paying accrued
arrearages. Id. See also Gillispie v. Gillispie, 8 Conn. App. 382, 512 A.2d 238 (1986); Delevett v.
Delevett, 156 Conn. 1, 238 A.2d 402 (1968) (improper for the noncustodial parent to automati-
cally reduce a lump sum support order proportionally as each child became emancipated). For a
survey of the varying approaches of other jurisdictions concerning nonconforming payments, see
Goold v. Goold, 11 Conn. App. 268, 527 A.2d 696 (1987).
Is HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47(d) (1976); Smith v. Smith, 3 Haw. App. 170, 647 P.2d 722
(1982). See also Napoleon v. Napoleon, 59 Haw. 619, 585 P.2d 1270 (1978) (rejecting as void a
prior agreement whereby the ex-wife released the husband from his child support obligation).
4 Massachusetts appears to require that child support payments must be made pursuant to
the terms of the decree. Nonconforming payments, with the exception of payment by disability
benefits, apparently are not acknowledged as payments per se. In Cohen v. Murphy, 368 Mass.
144, __, 330 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1975), the Massachusetts Supreme Court permitted credit for
Veteran Administration and Social Security benefits. The court declined to decide whether wel-
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Virginia; 7 and (7) Wisconsin. 8
Napoleon v. Napoleon" illustrates a typical approach the strict
construction states take regarding requests for retroactive modification
of child support orders. In Napoleon, the former wife had custody of
the couple's two children and the husband was obligated to pay $200
per month in child support. The husband fell in arrears and subse-
quently entered into an agreement with the wife modifying the support
order. The agreement, drafted by the wife's attorney, called for the
husband to pay $3,000 a year for child support for three years; at the
end of the three-year period the husband's child support obligations
were terminated. The husband fully performed under the private con-
tract. The Hawaii Supreme Court declared the agreement void. Citing
public policy concerns, the court held that the parties could not be
bound by such an agreement without consent of the court.20 The court
reasoned that once the issue of a child's welfare is placed before the
court, the minor becomes " 'a ward of the court,' subject to its inherent
fare payments would be entitled to similar treatment. Id.
16 In Gomez v. Gomez, 92 N.M. 310, 587 P.2d 963 (1978), the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(c) (1978), precludes a court from modifying child support
payments retroactively. To the extent that Gomez would be interpreted to hold the applicable date
for modification of child support payments should be the date for hearing, rather than the date of
filing a petition, application or pleading for relief, it has been expressly overruled by Montoya v.
Montoya, 95 N.M. 189, 619 P.2d 1233 (1980). Gomez was applied in Mask v. Mask, 95 N.M.
229, -, 620 P.2d 883, 885 (1980), to prevent the defendant husband from receiving credit
against arrearages for the amount of Social Security benefits paid to his client that exceeded his
support obligations. The court also held that equitable considerations would permit the defendant
to receive credit against his support obligation, to the amount of that obligation, from each month
the child received the Social Security benefit. Id. at -, 620 P.2d at 885-86. New Mexico is
considered, nevertheless, a strict construction jurisdiction because credit has only been applied to
Social Security benefits. See also Romero v. Romero, 101 N.M. 345, 682 P.2d 201 (Ct. App.
1984).
16 In Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764 (N.D. 1970), the Supreme Court of North Da-
kota announced the rule that accrued but unpaid child support payments cannot be modified. See
also Meadows v. Meadows, 312 N.W.2d 464 (N.D. 1981); Gasser v. Gasser, 291 N.W.2d 272
(N.D. 1980).
17 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1986); Korczyk v. Korczyk, 130 W. Va. 211, 42 S.E.2d 814
(1947). See also Horton v. Horton, 164 W. Va. 358, 264 S.E.2d 160 (1980) (credit for support
while children were in father's custody was inappropriate because trial courts lack power to cancel
or alter accrued installments of child support and because father had removed children from
mother's custody without her consent and without authority of court order).
"S Hirschfield v. Hirschfield, 118 Wis. 2d 468, 347 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1984). See also
O'Brien v. Freiley, 130 Wis. 2d 174, 387 N.W.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1986) (father not entitled to credit
for voluntary expenditures made on child's behalf). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the question.
11 59 Haw. 619, 585 P.2d 1270 (1978).
26 Id. at 624, 58.5 P.2d at 1273.
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authority to insure his continued well-being."21 The Hawaii Supreme
Court noted that in light of the mandate of Hawaii Revised Statutes
section 580-47 to maintain jurisdiction over questions involving support
of the parties' minor children, the agreement, lacking the court's ap-
proval, is not valid and binding, even as between the parties. 22
In Hirschfield v. Hirschfield,"3 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
also demonstrated classic strict constructionist analysis of a credit re-
quest for nonconforming payments. The noncustodial father petitioned
to have his child support arrearages expunged because of his direct ex-
penditures on his children. The father had made numerous monthly
advances directly to the children in the form of "school clothes and a
variety of other items."2 The court held that "the general rule . . . is
that a parent is not entitled to credit for voluntary expenditures for the
children not made in the manner specifically ordered. ' 25 The court de-
fined voluntary expenditures as any payment varying from the support
order.26
B. States with a Strict Approach but That Permit Retroactive
Modification In Limited Circumstances
The second group of states is typically strict constructionist, but
these states will permit deviation from the general rule against retroac-
tive modification in certain limited circumstances. These circumstances
include a consensual agreement between the parents, which provides
for nonconforming payments, or actions by the custodial parent which
do not justify strict compliance with the divorce decree. The states
which adhere to this approach are: (1) Arkansas;27 (2) Idaho;28 (3) In-
2 Id. See also Blackshear v. Blackshear, 52 Haw. 480, 478 P.2d 852 (1972).
12 Id. at 624, 585 P.2d at 1274. See also Pilson v. Salvoni, 79 F.2d 411, 412 (D.C. Cir.
1935); Warrick v. Hender, 198 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
23 118 Wis. 2d 468, 347 N.W.2d 627 (Ct. App. 1984).
24 Id. at -, 347 N.W.2d at 628.
25 Id.
20 Id.
27 The Arkansas courts have held consistently that a noncustodial parent is not entitled to
credit for nonconforming payments. See Nooner v. Nooner, 278 Ark. 360, 645 S.W.2d 671
(1983); Glover v. Glover, 268 Ark. 506, 598 S.W.2d 736 (1980); Buckner v. Buckner, 15 Ark.
App. 88, 689 S.W.2d 584 (1985) (en banc). But in Holley v. Holley, 264 Ark. 35, 568 S.W.2d
487 (1978) (en banc), the Arkansas Supreme Court advocated treating accrued child support
payments as the equivalent of a debt due, subject to any disallowance for periods of time when the
conduct of the custodial parent entitled to payment has defeated the rights of the noncustodial
parent. In Holley, the mother denied the father the visitation rights provided in the support decree
and the court held that the father was entitled to a limited credit against his support arrearages.
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diana; 29 (4) Kansas;3 ° (5) Michigan; ' (6) Ohio;32 (7) Nebraska; 3 and
(8) Virginia.3 4
Gagliano v. Gagliano,3 5 illustrates the modified strict approach to
One may, however, question the soundness of permitting credit against child support arrearages
because of misconduct by the custodial parent. Possible hardship to the child should not be judi-
cially fostered.
28 The Idaho approach is similar to that of Arkansas. The only consistent equitable trend has
been the balancing of arrearages in support payments by the noncustodial parent against the de-
nial of visitation rights or misconduct by the custodial parent. See, e.g., Nomer v. Kossman, 100
Idaho 898, 606 P.2d 1002 (1980); Heidemann v. Heidemann, 96 Idaho 602, 533 P.2d 96 (1974).
9 Whitman v. Whitman, 405 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), presents a comprehensive
summary of Indiana case law on nonconforming payments. In Whitman, the court acknowledged
the general rule that all modifications must operate prospectively, and also noted that all pay-
ments must be made in the manner, amount, and at times prescribed in the original order. Id. at
611-13. The court recognized that there was some authority to the contrary; in Indiana, however,
it found the prevailing view still favored the general rule. Id. But see Isler v. Isler, 422 N.E.2d
416, reh'g denied, 425 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) discussed infra at notes 39-41 and ac-
companying text.
30 Kansas is similar to Virginia in that credit may be allowed if reductions in payments were
with the consent of the mother. In Brady v. Brady, 225 Kan. 485, 592 P.2d 865 (1979), the
Supreme Court of Kansas allowed modification based on KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-260(b) (1983),
which gives the court discretion to relieve a party from a final judgment, but also reaffirmed the
general rule that modification of a support order may only be prospective. See also Davis v. Davis,
145 Kan. 282, 65 P.2d 562 (1937).
11 Michigan courts do not recognize the concept of credit against child support arrearages for
nonconforming payments by the noncustodial parent, but they do permit retroactive modification
of a support decree from the filing date if there has been a changed financial ability of the noncus-
todial parent to pay or changes in the children's need. See Wells v. Wells, 144 Mich. App. 722,
375 N.W.2d 800 (1985).
3" Ohio does not allow a court to retroactively modify a decree. A decree is a final judgment
as to the accrued and unpaid installments and unless the power of modification was expressly
retained as to the accrued installments, the court cannot modify the award as to past due and
unpaid installments. This rule is upheld unless the denial of retroactive modifications would be
contrary to public policy.
32 See Ferry v. Ferry, 201 Neb. 595, 271 N.W.2d 450 (1978); Wharton v. Jackson, 107 Neb.
288, 185 N.W. 428 (1921); Fussell v. State, 102 Neb. 117, 166 N.W. 197 (1918). It appears that
this type of retroactive modification will only be considered where the custodial parent has re-
moved the children from the jurisdiction, thus violating the visitation rights of the noncustodial
parent. See Goodman v. Goodman, 173 Neb. 330, 113 N.W.2d 202 (1962). However, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court is attempting to limit the scope of equitable decisions. See Conrad v. Con-
rad, 208 Neb. 588, 304 N.W.2d 674 (1981); Eliker v. Eliker, 206 Neb. 764, 295 N.W.2d 268
(1980).
1, In Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961), the Virginia Supreme Court
noted that the general rule is to deny credit for nonconforming payments. See also Fearon v.
Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 154 S.E.2d 165 (1967). But, in Gagliano v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447, 211
S.E.2d 62 (1975), the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the lower court's ruling that the hus-
band was entitled to payments made in reliance on what he thought was a bona fide agreement
with his wife. The court recognized a possible situation in which credit was appropriate, i.e., if the
parties enter into a voluntary agreement or consent to the payment. Id. at -, 211 S.E.2d at 65.
11 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975).
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retroactive modification. The trial court in Gagliano issued a divorce
decree requiring the husband to pay the wife $350 per month for sup-
port and maintenance of the wife and their child. A few months later,
the parties entered into a property settlement agreement which pro-
vided that the husband pay $250 per month in child support and that
alimony would be extinguished."' For approximately two years, the
husband complied with the private agreement and sent $250 per month
directly to the child. At the end of the two-year period, the wife sued,
claiming that the husband owed an arrearage of over $8,000.
The Virginia Supreme Court found that the money the husband
had paid to the child, while not strictly in conformity with the child
support decree, could be credited against the arrearage because the
payments were made pursuant to a consensual agreement between the
parties. The court, however, further found that the husband still owed
the difference between the amount of child support paid and the
amount due under the court decree. The court refused to find that the
payments made under the private agreement were pure gifts merely
because they were made directly to the child instead of the wife. The
court reasoned that because the funds received under the agreement
were "subject to her (the mother's) exclusive discretion," the payments
conformed with the substance of the divorce decree." The court there-
fore determined that the husband should not be punished for his "bona
fide agreement."'38
In Isler v. Isler,39 the Indiana Court of Appeals permitted retroac-
tive modification while stating that Indiana adhered to strict construc-
tion. Upon divorce, the mother retained custody of the three children
born of the marriage. The trial court ordered the father to pay $240
per month in child support. The mother petitioned the court for a rule
to show cause for nonpayment of support by her former husband. The
parties' two sons left their mother's home to live with their father. Each
child stayed with the father for at least four years and was supported
by him. 40 The court permitted an equitable exception to the general
rule against retroactive modification "where the obligated parent, has
taken the ... children into his . . . home, . . . has provided them with
food, clothing, shelter, medical attention, and school supplies, and has
36 Id. at __ 211 S.E.2d at 63.
37 Id. at -, 211 S.E.2d at 64.
38 Id. at..., 211 S.E.2d at 65.
11 422 N.E.2d 416, reh'g denied, 425 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
40 422 N.E.2d at 417.
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exercised parental control over their activities."' 1
C. Semi-Strict Construction States
A third group of states can be described as semi-strict because of
the circumstances in which they permit deviation from the rule against
retroactive modification. These situations include "exceptional circum-
stances" or "change in circumstances." The courts in these states are
inclined to look at the circumstances surrounding the nonconforming
payment before making a judgment. Although the circumstances are
broadly defined, a strong showing often is required before credit is
granted. These states include: (1) Iowa;' (2) Minnesota;"3 (3) Ne-
vada;"" (4) Oregon;' 8 (5) South Carolina;' and (6) Vermont. 4
4 425 N.E.2d at 670.
' The Iowa courts have applied the general rule announced in Delbridge v. Sears, 179 Iowa
526, 160 N.W. 218 (1916) to deny an obligated parent credit for nonconforming payments. See
Willcox v. Bradrick, 319 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1982). Retroactive modification is allowed to the date
of the filing of the application. Courts have also recognized that laches or estoppel by acquiescence
may be interposed in a proper case in defense of proceedings to collect unpaid support payments.
See, e.g., Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1973) (plaintiff would be equitably es-
topped from enforcing judgment because she led defendant to believe that she intended to waive
her right by failing to pursue that right for seventeen years). But see Thurn v. Thurn, 310
N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1981) (defendant's actions did not evidence an intent to waive her right to
support). In Cullinan v. Cullinan, 226 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 1975) the court refused to apply defenses
of laches or estoppel because the defendant father failed to show he was "materially prejudiced by
[his former wife's] delay in asserting her rights." Id. at 36.
"3 Under MINN. STAT. § 518.64, subd. 2 (1984), a retroactive modification or forgiveness of
support is permitted where the movant shows: 1) that a change in circumstances exists which
justifies modification; and 2) that the movant's failure to pay was not willful. See Lindberg v.
Lindberg, 379 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), af'd, 384 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 1986)
(acknowledging that there may be circumstances under which strong equities permit credit). But
see Moritz v. Moritz, 368 N.W.2d 337 (Minn. App. 1985) (general rule is that credit will not be
granted for nonconforming payments).
11 In Day v. Day, 82 Nev. 317, 417 P.2d 914 (1966), the Nevada Supreme Court held that
retroactive modification of child support arrearages is forbidden. But, in Hildahl v. Hildahl, 95
Nev. 657, 601 P.2d 58 (1979), the court indicates that it may be possible for the court to allow
credit for nonconforming payments provided the parties agree to accept such payments or pro-
vided compelling circumstances required the nonconforming payments to be made.
" The Oregon courts may begin to apply a somewhat less stringent approach to the general
rule that accrued and unpaid installments become final judgments due under the new version of
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.135(3) (1981). This amendment should let the courts know that they may
look into the circumstances surrounding nonpayment or nonconforming payment. Prior to the ap-
plication of the law, the Oregon Supreme Court stated in In re Marriage of Eagen, 292 Or. 492,
640 P.2d 1019 (1982) (en banc), that courts which set aside supplemental judgments for equitable
reasons "do violence to principles protecting the integrity of judgments and have ramifications far
beyond the law of domestic relations." Id. at 496, 640 P.2d at 1021. Also, there has been "equita-
ble" language in several Oregon cases. See Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Or. 193, 165 P.2d 772 (1946).
40 The South Carolina courts probably will not grant credit or a set-off against arrearages, in
JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW
Lindberg v. Lindberg,4 illustrates the court's analysis using the
semi-strict approach. In this case, the father was ordered to pay $600
per month in child support and $1,000 per month for twenty-four
months as maintenance, to enable the wife to acquire skills which
would permit her to help support the children in the future. During the
twenty-four month period, the three children lived with the father while
the mother was at school. The father directly provided for the mainte-
nance and support of the children when they lived with him. The father
petitioned the court to reduce the arrearages on child support by giving
him credit for the amount of direct support he provided to the children.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that the general rule against
retroactive modification prohibited granting the husband's motion. The
court stated that even if the arrangement that, the husband take care
of the children while the wife attended school, rose to the level of a
property settlement agreement, the court would not enforce such an
agreement unless and until the informal agreement was judicially ap-
proved.49 The court, however, cited hypothetical cases where a retroac-
tive modification may be permitted. The court stated, "For example,
where an obligated parent assumes all care and cost of a child for an
extended period of time, it may be unjust to require the obligor to
make payments to the custodial parent."" °
Hildahl v. Hildah 1 is another case where a semi-strict jurisdic-
tion denied retroactive modification but did not rule it out under all
circumstances. The parties were divorced, and the wife received cus-
tody of their three children. The court required the husband to pay
$750 per month in support and maintenance of the wife and the chil-
dren.52 A few months after the decree was entered, one of the children
contradiction to the general rule, unless exceptional circumstances exist. See Mixson v. Mixson,
253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969). In Bentrim v. Bentrim, 282 S.C. 333, 318 S.E.2d 131 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1984), the court specifically declined to adopt the rule that courts are without authority
to modify or cancel accrued payments.
11 In Towne v. Towne, 150 Vt. 406, 552 A.2d 404 (1988), the Vermont Supreme Court
decided that a trial court may retroactively modify a child support obligation, effective as of any
time since the petition for modification was filed. See also Davis v. Davis, 141 Vt. 398, 449 A.2d
947 (1982). In Davis, the Vermont Supreme Court adopted the rule that "credit (for Social Se-
curity benefits) should be applied unless the court entering the order indicates expressly that the
amount payable in its order are to be in addition to the government benefits." Id. at -, 449 A.2d
at 949 (emphasis in original).
4s 379 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), affd, 384 N.W.2d 442 (Minn. 1986).
19 379 N.W.2d at 577.
50 Id. at 578.
1 95 Nev. 657, 601 P.2d 58 (1979).
52 Id. at 659, 601 P.2d at 61.
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moved in with the father, who thereafter withheld $250 per month in
support. The wife brought suit to recover for the arrearage. The trial
court granted the motion and found the husband in contempt. The Ne-
vada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, citing Nevada's settled
law that support payments become vested upon accrual and therefore
cannot be retroactively modified. 53 The court found no basis for the
husband's contention that the wife had waived her custody rights and
that the husband had assumed de facto custody of the child. 54 Signifi-
cantly, the court further remarked that in certain situations equitable
considerations, such as abandonment by the custodial parent, agree-
ment between the parties, or mental or physical incapacity of the custo-
dial parent, would compel immediate transfer of custody without resort
to judicial process and a corresponding retroactive modification of child
support.5"
D. States That Apply Equitable Considerations but That Represent
Only a Trend
Under the fourth approach, the courts prefer to apply equitable
considerations to the issue of nonconforming payments, but such equi-
table discretion is sporadic and still only represents a trend. The states
in this group are: (1) Alaska;"8 (2) Arizona;57 (3) Colorado;58 (4) New
13 Id. at 660, 601 P.2d at 60.
54 Id. at 661, 601 P.2d at 61.
55 Id.
" The Supreme Court of Alaska in Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1978),
adopted the general rule that nonconforming voluntary payments made directly to the child are
not to be credited arrearages. However, the court has also recognized that equitable considerations
may justify granting credit for such payments, at least when that can be done without injustice to
the custodial parent. Id. at 203. Therefore, it appears that the Alaska courts are willing to look at
the nature of the payments to determine whether credit should be granted and will grant credit in
certain situations.
" See Adair v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 44 Ariz. 139, 33 P.2d 995 (1934). In
Badertscher v. Badertscher, 10 Ariz. App. 501, -, 460 P.2d 37, 41 (1969), the court held that
the general rule is that a father should be allowed credit for expenditures made while the child is
in his custody, where such payments constitute a substantial compliance with the spirit and intent
of the decree. See also Cole v. Cole, 101 Ariz. 382, 420 P.2d 167 (1966).
8 Colorado has continued to follow the majority rule, established in Garvin v. Garvin, 108
Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941). The courts, however, are beginning to recognize that there may
be some circumstances under which credit may properly be granted for nonconforming payments.
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that it may be appropriate if the payment is made
directly to the court-ordered recipient or if the husband detrimentally relies on the wife's assertion
that she does not want support or if the husband was denied visitation rights. See Talbot v. Tal-
bot, 155 Colo. 350, 394 P.2d 607 (1964) (en banc); Griffith v. Griffith, 152 Colo. 292, 381 P.2d
455 (1963) (en banc). But see Baker v. Baker, 667 P.2d 767 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
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Hampshire;" (5) Texas;60 and (6) Utah.61
In Badertscher v. Badertscher,62 upon divorce, the mother was
given custody of the parties' two children, and the father was ordered
to pay child support. Nearly one year after the divorce, the father took
custody of one of the children and provided direct support for the child
for three months. At the end of the three month period, an ex parte
order reinstated custody with the mother. Furthermore the court or-
dered, inter alia, that the father pay child support in the amount of
$200 per month for the period that the child had been in his custody.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and
found that the father was entitled to credit for funds expended on the
child during the father's custody. The court noted, "[t]he appellant
(the father), actually supported the children during this period and to
require that he also furnish the full support payments . . . is unwar-
ranted."' 3 The court then stated the general rule that a father should
be given credit for expenditures on a child in his custody, "where such
payments constitute a substantial compliance with the spirit and intent
of the decree."6 4
Guri v. Guri6 5 further illustrates state movement towards an equi-
table approach to retroactive modification of child support. In Guri, the
5 New Hampshire adheres to the position that modification of child support cannot be un-
dertaken unilaterally by the noncustodial parent. An equitable trend has emerged in recent years.
The key case in this area is McCrady v. Mahon, 119 N.H. 247, 400 A.2d 1173 (1979). The court
recognized two situations where equitable considerations warranted a grant of credit. These situa-
tions are: 1) where there are compelling circumstances which make direct payment to the child
necessary; and 2) where the custodial parent consents to the direct payments. Id. at __, 400 A.2d
at 1174. See also Guri v. Guri, 122 N.H. 552, 448 A.2d 370 (1982). However, recent cases
suggest that this equitable trend must be monitored carefully.
60 Texas law appears fairly well predisposed to deny credit despite the decision in Gould v.
Awapara, 365 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), which allowed credit for nonconforming pay-
ment. Subsequent cases have been uniform in denying credit for nonconforming payments, based
primarily on public policy arguments. See In re McLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974); Ex parte Holloway, 490 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
" In Utah, courts generally may not reduce or cancel accrued support installments. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (1984); Myers v. Myers, 62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123 (1923). However, in
the case of Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979), it appears clear that the courts will recognize
specific situations where equity dictates such modification. For example, the obligated parent
would be entitled to credit where 1) a child has lived with the noncustodial parent; or 2) the
custodial parent consents to payments by the noncustodial parent to voluntarily expend by the
obligated parent would entitle the latter to credit.
10 Ariz. App. 501, 460 P.2d 37 (1969).
Id. at -, 460 P.2d at 41.
e Id.
65 122 N.H. 552, 448 A.2d 370 (1982).
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husband fell in arrears in child support payments for his three children.
The wife brought suit to collect the arrearage. The 'husband raised the
defense that he had made payments directly to the child for educa-
tional and medical expenses which should be credited against his ar-
rearage. The trial court ruled for the wife and awarded her the full
amount due. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire stated that gener-
ally credit is not permitted for payments made directly to the child.66
The court noted that the rationale for the general rule is that the custo-
dial parent "should have the discretion to decide how to allocate sup-
port payments for the basic needs of the children." 7 The court pointed
out, however, two exceptions to the general rule: (1) where the custo-
dial parent fails to care for the basic needs of the children; and (2)
when there is a consensual agreement between the parties providing for
direct payments to the children. 8
E. States that Apply Equitable Considerations and That Are
Inclined to Grant Credit
The fifth group of states favor equitable resolution of nonconform-
ing payment issues but only in very limited categories. For example,
credit will be granted if there is consent for the nonconforming pay-
ment, or if there is action by the custodial parent which does not justify
strict compliance with the support order. The states included in this
category are: (1) Illinois;69 (2) Kentucky;70 (3) Louisiana; 7' (4) Missis-
86 Id. at -, 448 A.2d at 372.
17 Id. (citing McCrady v. Mahon, 119 N.H. 247, 248, 400 A.2d 1173, 1174 (1979)).
" Id.
8" In Illinois, it appears that the courts will grant credit to an obligated parent provided he
can prove the wife consented to the alternate form of payment. See Strum v. Strum, 22 I11. App.
3d 147, 317 N.E.2d 59 (1974). The courts will also allow credit if the obligated parent can show
that the custodial parent should be equitably estopped from collecting on the arrearage. Id. at
149-50, 317 N.E.2d at 61-62. In Escott v. Escott, 26 Ill. App. 3d 417, 325 N.E.2d 395 (1975), the
court also held that no credit will be allowed for periods of visitation, for payments to third parties
or for overpayments. See also In re Marriage of Dawn, 108 I11. App. 3d 808, 439 N.E.2d 1005
(1982); Harner v. Harner, 105 Ill. App. 3d 430, 434 N.E.2d 465 (1982).
"0 Kentucky has allowed credit for nonconforming payments in two limited circumstances.
First, it has allowed credit where it has found substantial compliance by the obligated parent.
Campbell v. Campbell, 209 Ky. 571, 273 S.W. 26 (1925). Second, it has allowed credit where
payment has been made under a compulsion of circumstances. Jackson v. Jackson, 306 Ky. 715,
209 S.W.2d 79 (1948). See also Dalton v. Dalton, 367 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
" Louisiana law on the issue of credits for nonconforming payments can be broken down into
several approaches. Two of the approaches concern equitable standards. For example, in Dubroc
v. Dubroc, 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980), the Louisiana Supreme Court found that where parties
have expressly agreed or consented to a different manner of payment, the lower courts have either
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sippi;73 (5) Montana; 73 (6) South Dakota;74 and (7) Wyoming. 75
Dubroc v. Dubroc76 illustrates the treatment these jurisdictions
give nonconforming payments. Pursuant to the divorce decree, the wife
retained custody of the parties' two children, and the husband was obli-
gated to pay $250 per month in child support. Shortly after the divorce,
the wife contacted the husband and requested that he take custody of
one of the children. The husband agreed on the condition that the wife
accept only $125 per month in child support. The arrangement ap-
peared to be concluded and both sides fulfilled their modified obliga-
tions for four years. At the end of that period, the wife filed suit to
recover child support due under the court order. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana found that the husband was entitled to credit for the support
directly given to the child in his custody. The court stated, "[a]n agree-
ment between divorced parents to suspend the mother's right to child
been willing to enforce their agreement or the courts have found an implied agreement when the
obligated parent provides direct support to the children due to the custodial parent's voluntary
transfer of custody to the noncustodial parent.
" The majority of cases in Mississippi appear to support the rule that child support pay-
ments become fixed and vested when due. Despite this rule, the Mississippi courts have either
allowed credit for nonconforming payments or relieved the obligated parent of his liability in two
sets of circumstances. The circumstances include: 1) credit granted for the time the children are
in the custody of the obligated parent; or 2) when the action of the receiving parent so offends the
principles of equity and justice that the court will not lend the parent its aid. See Cole v. Hood,
371 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1979) (court applied the "clean hands doctrine" to deny wife aid of court
since she willfully hid her children for period of years and kept her address secret); Schlom v.
Schlom, 149 Miss. 111, 115 So. 197 (1928).
11 In Montana, it is fairly clear that prospective modification of support orders is the general
rule. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208 (1987); Kelly v. Kelly, 117 Mont. 239, 157 P.2d 780
(1945). However, there is a growing recognition by the courts that certain circumstances, such as
prior agreements or where the spirit and purpose of the decree has been substantially complied
with, merit offsetting nonconforming payments against arrearages.
"' In South Dakota, the courts have repeatedly held that the child support statute authorizes
a court to modify a divorce decree both as to past due and future installments. See State ex rel.
Larsgaard v. Larsgaard, 298 N.W.2d 381 (S.D. 1980). However, before a court can exercise this
power, it must find that a change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of original child
support judgment. Id. at 384.
" The law in Wyoming appears to be unclear at this point as to whether retroactive modifi-
cation can be routinely granted upon a finding of equitable circumstances. WYO. STAT. 20-2-116
(1977), gives the trial court authority to revise and alter a divorce decree's support provision from
time to time as circumstances require. However, it appears to be clear from the case of Wardle v.
Wardle, 464 P.2d 854 (Wyo. 1970), that such modification is at least proper when the custodial
parent violates one of the provisions concerning custody of the children during visitation periods.
Under equitable principles, the trial court may leave the parties where they are, as far as past
payments are concerned-if the court considers it proper to do so and if it can be done without
jeopardizing the best interests of the child. Id. at 856.
7 388 So. 2d 377 (La. 1980).
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support is enforceable if it promotes the best interests of the child. 77
Significantly, the court did not find a general rule against retroactive
modification of child support payments, but rather the court focused on
whether the parties' arrangement was in the best interest of the child.
Thus, the court gave credit for consensual nonconforming payments
which effectuated "the ultimate goal of support and upbringing of the
child."78
In Strum v. Strum, 9 the Illinois court took an approach similar to
Louisiana. The parties divorced, and the court awarded the mother cus-
tody of their three children and ordered the father to pay $435 per
month in child support. One month after the divorce, one of the chil-
dren began living with the father. The other two children reached ma-
jority one year after the divorce. The father stopped paying child sup-
port, claiming that his child support obligations were extinguished
because he had custody of one child and the other two had reached
majority. The Illinois Court of Appeals found that past child support
payments are vested and a court is without power to modify the
amount due.80 The court observed, however, that it may apply the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel to prevent the custodial parent from assert-
ing the right to child support. The court found, as a matter of law, that
the obligation for child support terminated when the child reached ma-
jority." Additionally, the court ruled that because one child perma-
nently resided with him, the father no longer owed the wife child sup-
port with respect to that child.83 Thus, the court applied equitable
estoppel to prevent the wife from asserting her rights to child support.8"
F. States that Apply Equitable Considerations with Broad
Guidelines
States in this category are inclined to use equitable standards in
resolving nonconforming payment issues and merely require a party to
meet very broad guidelines. For example, credit may be granted if
there are compelling circumstances, if equitable circumstances dictate,
or if there is strict compliance with the spirit and intent of the decree.
77 Id. at 378.
78 Id. at 380.
11 22 I11. App. 3d 147, 317 N.E.2d 59 (1974).
80 Id. at 149, 317 N.E.2d at 61.
81 Id. at 149-50, 317 N.E.2d at 62.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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Included in this group of states are: (1) Alabama;8" (2) Florida;85 (3)
Maine;88  (4) Maryland;8 7 (5) Missouri;88  (6) Oklahoma; 89 and (7)
Washington."
84 The Alabama courts have held that child support payments become final judgments as of
the date due and are immune from modification when they are past due. See Wood v. Wood, 275
Ala. 305, 154 So. 2d 661 (1963). However, the courts have also recognized that there are situa-
tions in which equity will require credit for nonconforming payments. For example, credit is likely
to be granted provided the payments are in substantial compliance with the spirit and intent of the
decree. As enunciated in Keller v. Keller, 370 So. 2d 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), the key factor in
determining credit to arrearages is whether the evidence shows that the father contributed to the
actual support of the child. See also Binns v. Maddox, 57 Ala. App. 230, 327 So. 2d 726 (1976)
(Social Security payments received by wife for children's benefit could be credited against father's
obligation for child support under court decree).
8 The Florida courts will grant credit for nonconforming payments only when equitable cir-
cumstances dictate. Mooty v. Mooty, 131 Fla. 151, 179 So. 155 (1938). See also Tash v. Oesterle,
380 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But see Raybuck v. Raybuck, 451 So. 2d 540 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Martinez v. Martinez, 383 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (although
the Florida courts may grant credit, they will not do so without a careful review of the facts of the
cases focusing on equity).
88 Although the Maine courts have appeared to adopt the general common law approach to
the issue of retroactive modification, in practice, the courts are willing to look at the particular
circumstances of the case to determine whether credit can be granted for nonconforming pay-
ments and whether they serve the essential purposes of the decree. See Gardner v. Perry, 405
A.2d 721 (Me. 1979).
" Maryland consistently has followed the majority rule that voluntary payments made di-
rectly to the children are gifts, unless the obligated parent can prove express or implied consent, a
"compulsion of circumstances," and they are "in substantial compliance with the spirit and intent
of the decree." See Bradford v. Futrell, 225 Md. 512, 171 A.2d 493 (1961).
88 Missouri permits exceptions to the general rule requiring strict compliance with the terms
of a divorce decree. See Stemme v. Stemme, 351 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Steckler v.
Steckler, 293 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956). For example, credit may be granted if there is a
"compulsion of circumstances" or if there is consent to the nonconforming payment by the custo-
dial parent. Stemme, 351 S.W.2d at 825-26. See also Newton v. Newton, 622 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981) (father was entitled to credit against each monthly child support installment paid
that month to ex-wife from his disability Social Security benefits); Meyer v. Meyer, 493 S.W.2d
42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (father was entitled to credit for support supplied by him directly to
children with implied consent of mother). But see Klinge v. Klinge, 663 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983).
" Although the Oklahoma courts have repeatedly held that modification may only be pro-
spective, they recently have begun to lessen the harshness of this strict rule by looking into the
equities in each case. In part, the courts have stressed that credit should be granted where it
would be inequitable not to do so. For example, in Raczynski v. Raczynski, 558 P.2d 425 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1976), the court concluded that the more just approach is one that takes into considera-
tion the particular circumstances of each case-a "compulsion of circumstances" approach. See
also McNeal v. Robinson, 628 P.2d 358 (Okla. 1981) (father received credit for payments made
by him when children lived with him; circumstances supported finding of express or implied con-
sent of mother regarding payments, since she made no complaint for at least one and a half
years).
" In Washington, the courts appear to be willing to grant credit for nonconforming pay-
ments when equitable circumstances so require, provided no injustice is done to the custodial
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Keller v. Keller 1 represents the treatment these states give non-
conforming payments. In Keller, the divorce decree awarded custody of
the parties' child to the wife and obligated the husband to pay $100 per
month in child support. The husband never made any support pay-
ments, but he did assume the cost of sending the child to a military
boarding school. The wife sued to recover the support arrearage. The
Alabama appellate court ruled in favor of the husband, finding that the
custodial parent is not entitled to support payments if he or she did not
actually provide support for the child. The court held that a noncus-
todial parent is entitled to credit for direct support given the child. 92 It
stated, "[t]he key factor to be considered in giving credit on child sup-
port arrearages is whether the evidence shows that the father contrib-
uted actual support of the child." 93 Thus, the court was not concerned
about whether the form of the support payments conformed to the sup-
port decree; instead, it investigated which party actually supported the
child.
Similarly, in Bradford v. Futrell,94 the court looked to who, in
substance, rendered support for the children. The parties were di-
vorced, and the wife retained custody of their four children. The hus-
band was ordered to pay $80 per month in child support. Over a fifteen
year period, the husband failed to make the prescribed payments and
the wife obtained a judgment for the support arrearage. The husband
asserted that the transfers of money and several items of personal prop-
erty which he made directly to the children should be credited against
the support arrearage. The Maryland appellate court found that several
of the items were gifts, and thus the husband was not entitled to any
credit for these transfers. 95 Other items and money in the form of
checks made payable to one of the children were found to comply with
the "spirit and intent of the decree."96 The court gave the husband
credit for these payments.
parent. In Schafer v. Schafer, 95 Wash. 2d 78, 621 P.2d 724 (1980), the Washington Supreme
Court provided guideline factors that a court can use in determining whether credit should be
granted. The burden is on the obligated spouse to establish such circumstances. Id. at 82, 621
P.2d at 721.
91 370 So. 2d 306 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979).
92 Id. at 307.
93 Id.
225 Md. 512, 171 A.2d 493 (1961).
I ld. at 517, 171 A.2d at 494-95.
Id. at 518, 171 A.2d at 496.
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G. States that Use Equitable Discretion to Grant Credit
The states in this group are strongly inclined to grant credit for
nonconforming payments based upon equitable considerations. In these
states, the judge uses his discretion to decide whether to grant credit
for nonconforming payments. This group includes the following states:
(1) California;9 (2) Delaware;9" (3) Georgia;99 (4) New Jersey;100 (5)
New York;101 (6) North Carolina;102 (7) Pennsylvania;103 (8) Rhode
07 The case law in California dictates that the courts will grant credit for nonconforming
payments. However, the trial courts have a fair amount of discretion in considering these cases. It
appears that the California courts will grant credit for nonconforming payments where justice so
demands and where the parent has adequately provided for the children. See In re Marriage of
Utigard, 126 Cal. App. 3d 133, 178 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1981); In re Marriage of Matthews, 101 Cal.
App. 3d 811, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1980); In re Marriage of Peet, 84 Cal. App. 3d 974, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 108 (1978); Jackson v. Jackson, 51 Cal. App. 3d 363, 124 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1975); Sanford v.
Sanford, 274 Cal. App. 2d 535, 78 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1969).
98 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 508, 514 (1981) allow the courts to take an equitable ap-
proach to determine whether an obligated parent will be granted credit for any nonconforming
payments. See Lucy K.H. v. Carl W.H., 415 A.2d 510 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1979); Husband D. v. Wife
H. 451 A.2d 1165 (1982).
9 Given the current trend in Georgia law, it appears that the Georgia courts are now more
willing to look at the equities in a case before summarily applying the general common law rule.
See Dubois v. Dubois, 250 Ga. 271, 297 S.E.2d 277 (1982); Daniel v. Daniel, 239 Ga. 466, 238
S.E. 2d 108 (1977); Fawcette v. Fawcette, 226 Ga. 127, 172 S.E.2d 665 (1970). But see Davis v.
Davis, 251 Ga. 391, 306 S.E.2d 247 (1983).
100 Two New Jersey cases, Slep v. Slep, 43 N.J. Super. 538, 129 A.2d 317 (1957), and
Testut v. Testut, 34 N.J. Super. 95, 111 A.2d 513 (1955), along with New Jersey's policy of
allowing courts to retroactively modify child support orders, indicate that the courts are not ad-
verse to granting credit for nonconforming payments. Obviously, credit will continue to be a viable
option for the court.
10' The case-by-case approach taken by the New York courts exemplifies the discretion with
which they are vested in the area of nonconforming payments. The case law is fairly consistent
depending on the type of nonconforming payment involved. See Souran v. Souran, 80 Misc. 2d
476, 363 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975); Heinecke v. Heinecke, 41 A.D.2d 935, 343 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1973);
Wallace v. Harrice, 61 Misc. 2d 28, 304 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (citing Brill, infra);
Mintz v. Mintz, 5 Misc. 2d 542, 158 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1956); Kocourek v. Kocourek, I A.D. 2d 868,
149 N.Y.S. 2d 48 (1956); Moore v. MacKay, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Brill v. Brill,
148 A.D. 63, 131 N.Y.S. 1030 (1911). The New York statutes encourage credit. For example,
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1977) directs the courts to exercise their discretion as
justice so requires, while, at the same time, having due regard to the circumstances of the case.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 244 (McKinney 1977) explicitly extends this power to the actual enforce-
ment of a support order when a default has occurred.
102 In Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 231 S.E.2d 178 (1977), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals set guidelines to use when determining whether to grant credit for nonconform-
ing payments. The trial courts have great discretion in determining what is equitable under the
facts and circumstances of the past case and in applying the Goodson guidelines. See, e.g., Evans
v. Craddock, 61 N.C. App. 438, 300 S.E.2d 908 (1983).
"0I The Pennsylvania courts have an extreme amount of discretion in child support issues.
The Pennsylvania trial courts may retroactively reduce or cancel arrearages, and may grant credit
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Island;10 and (9) Tennessee. 10 5
The New Jersey approach in Slep v. Slep ° illustrates the propen-
sity of this group to use a case-by-case analysis of relevant equitable
principles when considering retroactive modification. Upon divorce, the
husband failed to comply with the child support order directing him to
pay $100 per month to his former wife. The wife sought recovery of the
arrearage accumulated over a sixteen year period. During this period,
the children had spent a substantial amount of time either living with
their father or at a place provided by him.
The Slep court first noted that an action for "past due installments
of support for children is an equitable remedy within the sound discre-
tion of the court. ' 07 Moreover, the court stated that "there is no vested
right to recover unpaid [child support] arrearages ... for it is always
within the power of the court to modify its original order with retroac-
tive effect. ' 10 8 The court denied the wife's petition for relief because
the husband had provided direct support to the children in excess of the
arrearage.
Tennessee followed the equitable discretion approach to petitions
for retroactive modification in Dillow v. Dillow.109 The husband fell in
arrears on payments to support his two children in his ex-wife's cus-
for certain types of nonconforming support payments. Absent a finding that the trial court abused
its discretion, these modifications are affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., Children Youth Servs. of Alle-
gheny County v. Chorgo, 345 Pa. Super. 512, 491 A.2d 1374 (Pa. 1985) (credit against child
support obligation for Social Security payments made directly to child is given as default value;
trial court, however, retains discretion to alter presumption in favor of credit and give partial or no
credit, should circumstances justify it).
"i' Rhode Island is one of the more progressive states in this area. In 1981, the General Laws
of Rhode Island were amended to state that a decree by the court changing the amount of support
may be made retroactive in the court's discretion to the date that the court finds that a substantial
change in circumstances has occurred. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2 (1988). In short, this
amendment gives broad discretionary power to the trial or family court judge. The trial court
decision in Kay v. Kay, 474 A.2d 86 (R.I. 1984) reflects a recognition of the equitable trend of
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.2.
"I Apparently, the Tennessee courts will grant credit for nonconforming child support pay-
ments in certain situations. For example, credit will be granted when the payments are in substan-
tial compliance with the purpose of the support order. The case law has relied upon the discretion
vested in the trial court to modify support orders, as well as on fairness to the parties. See Wilson
v. Bowman, 622 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Dillow v. Dillow, 575 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978).
'" 43 N.J. Super. 538, 129 A.2d 317 (1957).
107 Id. at 541, 129 A.2d at 319.
108 Id. at 542, 129 A.2d at 319.
109 575 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
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tody. After the divorce decree took effect, the parties entered into a
private agreement modifying the decree. Approximately four months
later, the husband petitioned the court to retroactively modify the di-
vorce decree due to changed circumstances. The Dillow court found
that the forgiveness of arrearages is a "matter that addresses itself to
the sound discretion of the Chancellor." 110 The court refused to apply
any fixed rules, and its analysis focused only on whether the Chancellor
abused his discretion. The court found that the Chancellor had abused
his discretion because the husband's remarriage was purely voluntary
and thus could not compel retroactive modification of the support
order."'
V. THE BRADLEY AMENDMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON JUDICIAL
DISCRETION TO CREDIT NONCONFORMING PAYMENTS
In October of 1986, Congress passed the Bradley Amendment,
codified at 42 U.S.C. Section 666(a)(9) of the Social Security Act.112
The statute requires all states to recognize child support payments as
judgments when they become due and to permit no retroactive modifi-
cations of the payments." 3 Thus, the numerous states which have rec-
ognized judicial discretion, in varying degrees, for retroactive modifica-
tion of child support orders are now prohibited from exercising
discretion. 1
4
The text of Section 666(a)(9) plainly states that a child support
payment is to be accorded the status of a judgment once the payment
110 Id. at 291.
"I Id.
1.2 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (Supp. V 1987). Subsection (a)(9) provides:
Procedures which require that any payment or installment of support under any
child support order, whether ordered through the State judicial system or through the
expedited processes required by paragraph (2), is (on and after the date it is due)-
(A) a judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect, and attributes of a
judgment of the State, including the ability to be enforced,
(B) entitled as a judgment to full faith and credit in such State or in any other
State, and
(C) not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other State.
See also supra note 3.
113 Id.
" See supra notes 26-110 and accompanying text. At the present time, 42 U.S.C. §
666(a)(9) alters the law in forty-two states. Some authorities have stated that fewer than forty-
two states now permit retroactive modification of support orders. These calculations appear to only
count the states which liberally permit retroactive modifications as permitting any form of retroac-
tive modifications. See, e.g., H.H.S. Rules Proposed on Proscription Against Retroactive Modifica-
tion of Support Arrears, 13 Fain. L. Rptr. (BNA) 1600, 1601 (Oct. 1987).
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becomes due. Having the legal force of a judgment, the obligee's right
to such child support payments must be given full faith and credit in all
states.115 Section 666(a)(9) further provides that once a payment vests,
it cannot be modified by any state. The statute limits the court's discre-
tion to "modification with respect to any period during which there is
pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that notice
of such petition has been given, either directly or through the appropri-
ate agent, to the obligee or (where the obligee is the petitioner) to the
obligor.""' 6 To the extent that a court construes a credit request for
nonconforming payments to be a petition for retroactive modification,
the Bradley Amendment would seem to prevent the exercise of judicial
discretion, however inequitable the result.
The Bradley Amendment demonstrates Congressional concern for
the losses the federal government was incurring under Title IV-D."7
Frequently, obligors, whose child support payments are used to reim-
burse the state Title IV-D agency for A.F.D.C. payments to obligees,
petition courts to reduce child support arrearages based upon changed
circumstances. The debtor spouse often succeeds in obtaining relief in a
different state from where the support order was entered or where the
child and custodial parent reside. " 8
The Bradley Amendment undoubtedly will contribute to the Con-
gressional goal of providing for more effective enforcement of child
support in all cases, including Title IV-D proceedings, as well as estab-
lishing uniformity among the states. A literal reading of the statute,
however, leads to questions about the equity of a strict application of
Section 666(a)(9). Because the statute mandates that support pay-
ments become judgments when due and does not provide for any judi-
cial discretion, child support payments made by an obligor which do
" 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9) (Supp. V 1987).
"' Id.
" Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies
Appropriations for FY87. Part 2: Department of Health and Human Services: Hearings on H.R.
5233 Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Services and Education Appropria-
tions on the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1129-51 (1986). Steve
Ritchie, of the Office of Child Support Enforcement, Department of Health and Human Services,
testified that the Office was suffering "serious short falls" in reimbursements by noncustodial par-
ents for funds paid directly to the custodial spouse under Title IV-D programs. See also Use of
Tax Refund Offsets to Collect Non Tax Federal Debts: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Oversight
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-39 (1986) (testimony of Ros-
coe L. Egger, Jr., Commissioner of Internal Revenue).
II H.H.S. Rules Proposed on Proscription Against Retroactive Modification of Support Ar-
rears, supra note 114, at 1601.
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not conform to the letter of the support decree, will not be credited to
the obligor and may be considered by some courts as gifts. For exam-
ple, where the obligor and obligee informally agree to alter the terms of
a child support decree, so that the amount of money the obligor pays to
the clerk of the court is reduced in return for the obligor making an in
kind payment directly to the child, the obligor still would be responsi-
ble for the difference between the agreed payments made to the court
and the court-ordered payments. More dramatically, in the absence of
a modification order, if the custodial parent abandons a child and the
obligor assumes direct financial responsibility for child care, the obligor
would still be liable for the court-ordered payments which became
judgments when due under Section 666(a)(9).
Due to what appears to be the nondiscretionary nature of the stat-
ute, a judge could not reduce the child support arrearage in the above
cases even though, in substance, the obligor spouse has made the child
support payments in compliance with the spirit and intent of the sup-
port order. One may, however, read Section 666(a)(9)(C)-"not sub-
ject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other State"" 9
as leaving the court free to retroactively modify support orders as to
form rather than amount, and thereby grant a credit request for non-
conforming payments. To the extent that Section 666(a)(9) was never
intended to apply to the nonconforming payments situation, the statute
is unclear and should be amended to recognize judicial discretion to
grant credit in appropriate circumstances.
VI. A STATUTORY PROPOSAL FOR JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO
RETROACTIVELY MODIFY CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS AS TO FORM OF
PAYMENT
Although, as discussed in this Article, the rule against retroactive
modification serves many useful purposes, an absolute bar to retroac-
tive modifications of child support payments can produce unjust results
when the rule is misapplied. In situations where the obligor makes non-
conforming payments to the child or obligee, within the spirit and in-
tent of the support decree, or where the obligor requests credit for sup-
port provided during a period of agreed upon custody (something more
than visitation), an absolute prohibition on judicial discretion to award
credit is unfair. By grouping the nonconforming payment cases with
42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C).
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cases where the obligor seeks to reduce the amount of child support
payments due to changed circumstances, many courts treat two situa-
tions in the same manner where the legal and equitable considerations
are quite different. 120 A literal reading of Section 666(a)(9) to include
credit for nonconforming payments under the ban against retroactive
modification contributes to the confusion.
To remedy this problem, Congress and the state legislatures could
enact statutes which provide for judicial discretion in all cases involving
petitions for retroactive modification of child support orders. For the
reasons discussed in this Article, the need for discretion in all cases is
outweighed by the policies supporting the rule against retroactive modi-
fication. The better approach, however, is to limit application of the
rule to cases where an obligor seeks retroactive modification of the
amount of support due to changed circumstances. This approach would
have the salutary effect of removing nonconforming payments from the
shadow of federal and state rules against retroactive modification of
child support orders. Credit for nonconforming payments should be
given when, in the discretion of the trial court or hearing officer, equi-
table circumstances dictate. To accomplish this the legislature should
authorize judges to grant credit requests and retroactively modify child
support orders.121
The following amendment (italicized) to 42 U.S.C. Section 666(a)
is proposed to accomplish this purpose:
(9) Procedures which require that any payment or installment of support
under any child support order, whether ordered through the State judicial
system or through the expedited processes required by paragraph (2), is (on
and after the date it is due)-
(A) a judgment by operation of law, with the full force, effect, and at-
tributes of a judgment of the State, including the ability to be enforced,
(B) entitled as a judgment to full faith and credit in such State or in any
other State, and
(C) not subject to retroactive modification by such State or by any other
State;
120 See supra notes 4-77 and accompanying text.
121 To the extent that child support payments vest or become judgments on the date due,
granting credit for nonconforming payments may resemble a retroactive modification as to
amount. The obligor's request, however, is merely to award credit for support previously paid, and
in no way seeks relief from a civil judgment. If equity dictates, the obligor should be entitled to a
set-off against an arrearage even if the unpaid support of record has been reduced to judgment
prior to the obligor's credit request.
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except that such procedures may permit modification with respect to any pe-
riod during which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from
the date that notice of such petition has been given, either directly or through
the appropriate agent, to the obligee or (where the obligee is the petitioner) to
the obligor.
(10) Provided that nothing in paragraph (9) of subsection (a) shall prevent
an order which retroactively modifies the form and not the amount of any
child support order - including an order of credit against a child support
arrearage for a nonconforming payment, whether ordered through the State
judicial system or through the expedited processes required by paragraph
(2); and said order may be based upon factors which include but are not
necessarily limited to the following:
(A) the extent to which the obligor's expenditure conforms to the spirit
and intent of the support order;
(B) whether the obligor's expenditure was made with the consent or at
the request of the obligee;
(C) periods of time, excluding reasonable visitation, unless otherwise
provided by order or decree, during which the obligor has physical custody
of the child with the knowledge and consent of the party authorized by law
to have custody of the child; and
(D) whether a nonconforming payment is made under a compulsion of
circumstances.
Because a single case cannot cover every situation which may
arise, the Washington Supreme Court in Schafer v. Schafer,122 pro-
posed the following factors which the judiciary should take into ac-
count when exercising discretion in nonconforming support payments
cases: First, the court should look at whether the noncustodial parent
(a) intended the nonconforming payments to be in satisfaction of the
decree; or (b) attempted to obtain or retain custody for improper pur-
poses. Second, the court should consider whether the custodial parent:
(a) was willing and able to provide necessary care for the child; (b)
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the noncustodial parent's contin-
ued custody; or (c) was relieved of the reasonable expenses of child
support while the child was in the custody of the noncustodial parent.
A third factor is the duration of child's stay with the noncustodial par-
ent. Finally, the court should decide whether cogent reasons exist to
require the noncustodial parent to provide direct support of the child,
as well as to comply with the support order to make payments to the
custodial parent. 123
122 95 Wash. 2d 78, 621 P.2d 721 (1980). See also supra note 88.
'" Id. See also Goodson v. Goodson, 32 N.C. App. 76, 81, 231 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1977).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The petition to retroactively modify child support orders based
upon changed circumstances seeks to alter the amount of child support
owed, whereas the credit request for nonconforming payments merely
seeks judicial approval for payments made in a different form from
that ordered by the court. Many courts nevertheless treat these two
very different situations as being subject to the rule against retroactive
modification. The amount of judicial discretion in nonconforming pay-
ments cases varies among the state jurisdictions. Certainly considerable
economic hardship and unfairness to obigors may result from a court's
strict application of Section 666(a)(9) which prohibits retroactive mod-
ification to an obligor's credit request for nonconforming payments
made within the spirit and intent of the support decree. This Article
proposes a solution to this problem which will ensure equitable discre-
tion without undermining effectiveness of child support enforce-
ment-an amendment to 42 U.S.C. Section 666(a). The proposed
amendment provides the court with express authority to award credit
for nonconforming support payments. By excepting credit requests for
nonconforming payments from Section 666(a)(9)'s rule against retroac-
tive modification, the proposed amendment, Section 666(a)(10), will
remove nonconforming payments from the shadow of the rule and place
the matter within the equitable discretion of the first decider, where it
belongs.

